反腐与中国城市地方政府的土地出让

上海交通大学国际与公共事务学院陈杰教授作为通讯作者与上海财经大学公共经济与管理学院三位博士生赵仁杰、冯晨、钟世虎共同合作在土地管理国际顶级期刊Land Use Policy 2020年六月号正式出版发表论文“The Impact of Anti-Corruption Measures on Land Supply and the Associated Implications: The Case of China”。该文通过研究反腐风暴对中国城市地方政府土地出让行为的影响，来说明提升政府治理以消除腐败是实现土地市场平稳和提高土地资源配置效率的重要前提。Land Use Policy为环境类SSCI一区期刊，2019年影响因子3.682。

文献目录信息：

Zhao, Renjie, Jie Chen*, Chen Feng, and Shihu Zhong. 2020. “The Impact of Anti-Corruption Measures on Land Supply and the Associated Implications: The Case of China.” Land Use Policy 95 (June): 104605.

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.landusepol.2020.104605. https://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0264837719317144

概要：土地资源配置是城市可持续发展的关键问题，但它又受制于城市的政府治理能力。本文以反腐风暴为外生冲击事件，考察2006年至2016年中国地级市官员落马和城市土地出让之间的关联，重点分析了地方主要领导人因腐败被免职后该地土地供应的变化。通过DID框架识别策略得出的估计结果表明，当地方主要官员因腐败落马后，该市土地交易的面积和交易额都会出现显著下降，而且土地交易额的下降幅度更大。我们还发现，在地方领导人因为腐败落马后，城市土地供应的减少主要来自商业和住宅用地，公共用地的供应反而增加，同时土地供应的市场化水平提高，工业用地廉价转让现象减少，表明后任官员为减少因腐败而落马风险的策略性调整。此外，本研究还探讨了不同级别和不同岗位官员落马所带来影响的异质性，并还证实了这种落马效应具有长期持续性影响。通过实证证据表明了反腐措施对当地政府后续的土地供应策略具有持续的惩戒警告作用，本文强调了对官员的治理机制深刻地影响着中国城市土地市场的运作机制，进而影响其效率。比如，本文相当于通过反事实推导，表明土地市场上存在的腐败加大了土地市场的波动，降低了土地资源的配置效率。提升政府治理能力，降低官员腐败发生机会，有助于促进土地市场的稳定发展和提高土地资源配置的效率。

Highlights:

•This paper analyzes how land supply response to the ousting of local key officials in urban China due to corruption prosecution.

•Corruption crackdown is used as the exogenous shock to identify the relationship corruption and land supply.

•Both the volume and value of land sales dropped significantly after the local officials’ ousting.

•The supply of commercial and residential land dropped but the supply of land for public use increased.

•The marketization level of land supply increased and cheap transfer of industrial land became less.

•The heterogeneity of the effect was investigated, and the long-term persistence of this effect was confirmed.

Abstract:

The allocation of land resources is a crucial issue in sustainable urban development, but it is subject to the vagaries of public governance. By using the prosecution of corrupt local leaders as the shock event, and exploring the data on sacked officials and land transfers in prefecture-level cities in China from 2006 to 2016, we analyse the changes in the supply of land in response to the ousting of key local officials for corruption. The estimations derived through the identification strategy of the DID framework show that both the volume and value of land sales dropped significantly after the local officials’ ousting, with the value of total land sales reacting to a much greater extent. We also found the reduction of land supply was mainly from commercial and residential land but a greater supply of land for public use following the local leaders’ ousting, accompanied with an increase in the level of marketisation in the supply of land and a reduction in cheap transfers of industrial land. In addition, the heterogeneity of the effect across the rank and type of official was investigated, and the long-term persistence of this effect was confirmed. By showing that anti-corruption measures have a persistent disciplinary effect on officials’ subsequent land supply strategy, this paper underscores that the quality of public governance profoundly influences the functioning of the land market.

https://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0264837719317144